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Abstract
For many American cities, fiscal crisis has now become fiscal routine.
It is now five years since the advent of the acute stage of the New York City
fiscal crisis, and in the intervening years numerous other cities have faced
their own financial emergencies.
11

11

With this time perspective in mind, it

is now appropriate to re-examine some propositions suggested earlier in this
period, and to examine the conduct. of urban management in a time in which
fiscal stringency has become more the norm than the exception.
This paper will re-examine the performance of urban administration in
portions of the New York City government, and will report on some of the
variations in management which have occurred in the post-crisis period.

It

will also investigate the behavior of those w-ith supervisory responsibility
over urban managers, to examine how the external constraints on urban
management have evolved as fiscal stringency has become routinized. ·(As
just one indicator of this change from crisis to routine, the New York City
Emergency Financial Control Board, the state monitoring agency with responsibility for overseeing New York City expenditure practices, has now dropped
the word Emergency from its title.)

•

I
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One clear consequence of the New York City fiscal crisis is that
the amount of information generated about city agencies has dramatically
increased.

Perhaps because one element of the crisis was the apparent

inability of city officials to provide adequate and current information
on the state of municipal finances, considerable effort has obviously
been put into the generation of extensive statistical summaries of -the
financial situation of both the city as an entity, and also its component
agencies.

As a by-product of this effort, additional data is also

generated on the management of these agencies.
Since the "solution" of the N.Y.C. fiscal crisis required the
continuing presence of outside monitoring bodies, the reports generated
by and for these external controllers provides an additional source of
data about municipal operations.

While there is no reason to expect

agency heads to be especially forthcoming in their presentations to
these outside bodies, the very fact that they are called on to endlessly
report to outside monitors itself can influence their behavior.
In this study, I am focusing particular attention on the ways in
which different city agencies present themselves to this small but
vitally important "attentive public."

I will be particularly interested

in their use of productivity measures which actually relate to departmental
11

effectiveness.

11

For the purposes of this research, I am less interested

in the improvement (or deterioration) of service which these indicators
show, but rather in whether the indicators are developed in the first
pl ace. 1
I suggested in earlier work that environments of budgetary stringency
change the incentive systems which operate for municipal decision-makers,
particularly those with agency administrative responsibilities.

In the
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American context, "fiscal crisis" has brought with it an accelerated
entrance into the decision-makfog process of "outsiders," -- individuals
with supervisory responsibilities whose values are closer to those of
the business community than of traditional urban public-sector decisionmakers.2

We

ought to anticipate, I argued, that models of success
11

11

in the private sector would be emulated by those public sector agency
heads who saw fiscal crisis as a common feature of urban administrative
life, and who hoped, nevertheless, to "make a name for themselves by
effectively administering under stringency. 3 One component of such a
11

personal strategy, I ~ow suggest, would be the adoption of a form of
measurement of agency effectiveness comparable to the data which private
~ector managers are routinely expected to produce.
To argue that the incentive system for urban public managers works
in this way is not to assume an identity, or even much of a similarity,
between public and private management.

Rather, it is based on a view

that if those with policy control increasingly come to be made up of
individuals who share the "business ethic,

11

that ambitious public

managers will pr.esent themselves in ways which conform to the expectations
of that ethic.
A variety of hypotheses can be developed about the possible circumstances which will lead to agency ability to present itself in businsslike
11

-,

terms.

In one interpretation, which I will call the sectoral
11

11

perspective,

some public agencies have missions which are closer to those of private
sector organizations, and are, therefore, more easily measurable in
11

effi ci ency terms.

11

-

11

-

Hard public services -- those with an engineering
11

component -- are sometimes thought to be more readily adapted to the use
4
of such indicators than are the softer urban social services.
11

11

11
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A second hypothesis focuses on availability of resources, and more
particularly on changes in the availability of resources.

Those agencies

forced into the severest forms of stringency, -- those agencies with the
largest percentage reductions in their budgets -- will have the least
sla.ck available for the commitment of time and effort needed to generate
such information, while those agencies with the least extensive reductions
'

wi 11 be better ab 1e to afford such 11 1uxuri es. 115 I sha 11 refer to this
hypothesis as the 11 budgetary change 11 perspective.
There is, of course, an almost completely opposite hypothesis, in
which it would be argued that since agencies under the greatest pressure
to cut back will have the greatest need for efficiency and therefore they
will be the most likely candidates for developing measures of output
effectiveness. This view, while widely held in the general public and a
staple of political speechmaking, finds little support in the literature
on administration.

But both perspectives about the impact of budgetary

stringency, whether they see it as a useful prod or an obstacle to
effective management, have in common a perspective which sees change in
agency budgets as a significant determinant of the p-resence or absence of
the types of managerial changes being considered here.
·A third hypothesis focuses on individual leaders.

In this perspective,

the key determinant of the adoption of effectiveness measures is not the
nature of the agency's mission nor its status with regard to funding
cutbacks, but rather the accident of the values and interests of the
11

11

individuals who come to have managerial responsibility in the various
muni ci pa 1 agencies.

I wi 11 refer to this view as the qua 1i ty of

management perspective.
11

II

-4There can be no question about the sensitivity of outside observers
to municipal performance in the development of such indicators.

While

concern with 11 productivity 11 in the municipal workforce was first made
a part of public political discourse in the Lindsay Administration, 6
the advent of the fi sea 1 crisis has· brought into the pub 1i c sector a
greater number of individuals with significant private sector experience
with such efforts, and more significantly than their entrance alone, has
brought them into positions of significantly greater power (if not control)
than was true for any earlier group of private sector advisors. 7 The
first head of the New- York City "Office of Operations," a part of the Mayor 1 s
office with responsibility for administering the city's "Management Plan, 11
was a high-ranking executive of New York Telephone, on loan to the city
(and with the telephone company continuing to pay his salary).
The position of "outside experts 11 from the private sect.or has
changed from one of advice-giving to placement in positions of potential
control over agency administrators.

Thus, _even if agency administrat.ors

have even more limited resources than during earlier periods, the salience
of 11 business advice," or at least the perceived utility of demonstrating
an ability to operate one 1 s department in a 11 businesslike 11 way, will
surely attract their attention as it would not have before.
But in addition to this view that business leaders were more
significantly placed as potential controllers of agency administrators
in the post-fiscal crisis period, agency administrators would also have
been aware that similar themes were being articulated within the city•s
political leadership.

While it is always difficult to systematically

assess the centrality of any elected official s statements to his actual
1

operating system when in power, Mayor Koch has placed more emphasis on
developing good management within his administration than had been
11

11

-5true in previous administrations. 8 Whtle such a rhetorical commitment is
obviously no guarantee of action, it once again reinforces the point
that the politically sensitive and ambitious administrator would have seen
many reasons to be responsive to requests from superiors that he develop
measures of agency effectiveness.
In addition to pressures for 11 hard indicators" from supervisors
interested in detecting targets for possible future economies, the postcrisis adminstrators also faced pressure from his rank-and-file workforce.
This workforce, heavily unionized in- New York City, had agreed in the first
round of collective bargaining after the beginnings of the fiscal crisis
to wage increases which would be tied to demonstrable improvements in
agency 11 pr,oductivity. 11 Satisfying one's workforce, therefore, required
administrators to develop indicators which, while acceptable to external
watchdogs, were also sufficiently flexible to allow employees and their
union leaders to feel confident that the outcome of 11 productivity 11 measures
would be sufficiently positive to justify Cost-of-living 11 wage increases.
11

While this direct tie between productivity and wage increases was
dropped in the first round of contracts signed during the Koch Administration,
the politically sensitive administrator would still have experienced a period
when the demand for hard indicators" of agency success meant one thing to top
11

municipal leadership and external monitors, and quite another to employee groups.
One of the classic problems with effectiveness indicators, of course,
is the likelihood that administrators will manipulate them in such a way
as to present themselves as improvers of their agency s performance.
1

While

this concern persists, there are several factors which make it somewhat
less significant in times of budgetary stringency than might otherwise be
the case.
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Of primary importance is public reaction to fiscal crisis, at least the,
reaction as it has developed in New York.

A numher of city administrators inter-

viewed in th.is research described a sense of 1essened public expectations as one·
9
of the most surprising outcomes of the fiscal crisis.
Although New Yorkers "do
not suffer in silence," as one former top administrator put it, he also suggested
that New York had seen a:
decl ining 1evel of public expectations. People expect government service to be poor and civil servants to be lethargic. They
accept a 1evel of poor performance. 11
11

Another administrator, who had held both central and line agency responsibility argued that:
there has been a stunning decline in public demand for services.
People won't ask for anything. When we ran a surplus last summer
I asked people what they thought of this they said it's a good
thing, we've turned the corner. 11
11

We've sinned in the past and w~ don't really deser¥e to have any
money spent. Where I sit now /in a line agency supervisory
position/ there is a lot of demand for increased serv·ices, but
it is easily turned aside in a surprising number of cases. I
think the most surprising thing is the lack of demand from minority
groups. There's a general belief that the city can't afford to do
it. The mayor has been very successful in creating that belief. 11
11

Attitudes of this sort among top administrators, both in central policy
positions and in line administrative work, suggest that some of the risks of
showing "poor performance• in management reports are lessened as the general public
comes to see such results as

11

inevitable. 1 '

On the other hand, I am suggesting

that an environment of fiscal crisis increases the incentives for managers to
take steps to "look good 11 to those external monitors who are perceived to have
the ability to financially reward and punish the agency.

An example of attitudes

of this sort can be found in the remarks of another 1 ine administrator, who compared the responses of two commissioners in other departments in responding to
external monitors:
"the city wanted to have an MBO program and they selected two agencies
to do it ... one did nothing with it, but the /commissioner of the other
. department/ went at it hammer and tongs. He-saw that as a way of
getting control of the department. It was a way of putting in performance standards and saying it was coming from on high. 11

-7After providing this favorable evaluation of what had been done in another
agency, this administrator went on to des~ribe the tactics he was using in his
own department:
11

We like to be the first in the city to do something. You get some
credit for doing it, and since you 1 re first you 1 re not compared to
anybody else. We volunteered to i nsta 11 measurement systems through- ·
out the city /to measure-the department 1 s effectiveness/ and we have
been able to acquire additional capital equipment. 11
The extent to which an administrator might be willing to use effectiveness
measures could also be related to the perception held about the extent to which
the New York City government had become more

11

businessl ike. 11

One former central

administrator saw rel at;.vel y 1ittl e. of this:
11

The private sector was of 1 ittl e importance. Some people were
imported out they made little impact ... /7he real significance of
the fiscal crisis/-has been how resistant the city has been to
change. It failed to change the governmental process, although
the structure of power has oecome more elite-like. 11
Predictably, this administrator saw little value in the types· of productivity
measures which agencies were required to generate.
This perspective can be sharply contrasted with the views of a current
commissioner:
This is a business. You can run almost any city agency 1 ike
a business. It depends on-how you de_fine your bottom 1 ine.
For an agency like this it 1 s -straightforward, we produce a
consumable service, it 1 s measureable, and a price can be put
on it. 11
11

His agency produ~ed detailed output measures which related to service quality.
His task. of course was simplified, as he himself recognized, by the
of his service, one that

11

11

hard 11 ·nature

is measureable, 11 and can have a llprice put on it. 11

despite his recognition that

11

But

measurement 11 was easier in his service than in some

others, this commissioner nevertheless felt that simi 1ar types of measures could
be developed for

11

almost any city agency. 11

Another commissioner, with responsibility- for a
partially disagreed.
was that:

11

soft 11 social servi.ce,

His perception, mirroring Anthony Downs' classic formulation,

10
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the fundamental pro bl em of New York. City is the same as for a11
government, they don I t make a profit. As long as they don I t make
a profit, the incentive for people to do a good job is just not
there. If the city was to allow people to make a profit, to make
a few; extra bucks, I think the services would be uniformly better.
11

11

Although this commissioner has responsibility for a social service, it is
interesting to note that his formulation would apply to the 11 harder 11 engineering
· services as well.

But a feeling that profit standard was unavailable did not

mean, in this commissioner's perception, that no measurement of success was
possible.

He listed a wide variety of specific indicators of program success

which he had put into position, and indicated with pride, "those are things that
were never done before. 11
Another line administrator had a different perspective.

He saw the external

monitoring structure which had developed in New York City in the aftermath of the
1975 fiscal crisis as an example of missed opportunities for structural· reform.
The external structures, particularly the Emergency Financial Review Board, were:
a resource which was used somewhat, but not as much as it could
have been. It could have put pressure on social service agencies
to- reform their practices, but not much of that happened.
11

For this official, external constraints were potentially positive, but had not
been fully exploited.

Just as the Emergency Financial Control Board, so too

other external actors had opportunities for influence which had not been fully
realized:
"The feds were a resource for us, they came in to insist that
the city not modify its financial plan upwards, but in terms of
programmatic priorities, no. There was a lot of impact from the
banks, the federal government, and from Proxmire about what should
be done, but there was no sign of impact in ~haping what actually
was done in terms of city services, where the city spent the money.
(emphasis in interview)

11

In similar fashion, this administrator believed that:
The fiscal crisis was an occasion to handle a lot of small management pro bl ems, but not the major things.
11

11

And in distinction to some of his colleagues quoted above, this administrator felt
that the use of productivity indicators was nothing more than sham.

To the extent
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they had any real meaning, it haddisappeared after the municipal labor.
contracts of 1978 broke the tie between productivity improvements and "cost of
1 iving 11 wage increases:

"With the labor contracts of 1976 when there was a tie to productivity there were significant changes, dollar savings. The
majority were sham, but there were some real things. But when
the Mayor gave them all away in the second post crisis contract,
that killed them. We didn't preserve anything that had been
done previously."
·
As this variation in opinions demonstrates,admini!trators in N.Y. City had diverse
interpretations of the impact of the fiscal crisis on municipal management, and
of the value of the efforts of externa 1 monitors to improve the city's admi nstration.

Not surprisingly; therefore, we also find considerable diversity in the

ways in which city agencies responded to external directives for management
reform which they received.
In the next section of this paper, I shall present data on two examples of
this variation in response. ·one 'indicator will be the ways in which various
agencies complied with the requirements of the revised New York City Charter for
a municipal- "management report. 11

The revised charter requires that the report

contain, for each city agency:
"program and performance goa 1 s for the current fi sea 1 year, to
include a statement and explanation of the performance measures,
and a statement of actual performance for the first six months
of the fiscal year relative to goals; and, the pr~posed program.
and performance goals for the next fiscal year. 11
The first such report, issued as the Mayor's Management Report, appeared on
12
February 20, 1978.
I shall be particularly interested in the extent to which
the "performance measures II included for the various muni ci pa 1 agencies include
indicators of actual program outputs and effectiveness.

As will be seen below,

not all agencies produced indicators of this kind.
The second data set I will be examining con~ists of responses of municipal
agencies to "Cost Reduction Memoranda II subm1tted to city agencies by the Emergency
Financial Control Board.

The Financial Emergency Act of 1975, the New York

I

I

-10State legislation whtch. estab.l ished the Control Board, gave the Board the
authority to:.
"recommend to the City and the covered organizations /municipal
agencies not under direct Mayoral supervision/ such measures
relating to their operations, management, efficiency and productivity as it deems appropriate to reduce costs and improve
services. 1113
By June, 1979, the Control Board had submitted 69 such memoranda to city
agencies.

At that time the Office of the State Comptroller, Office of the

Special Deputy Comptroller for New York City (which conducts much of the detailed
work on behalf of the Control Board), codified the responses made by city agencies,
the amount of time it took the various city agencies to respond, and the Special
Deputy Comptroller's evaluation of the responses made.

These two data sets,

therefore, provide good summary indicators of the ways in which New York City
agencies presented themselves to their external supervisors in the years immediately
following the fiscal cri_sis of 1975, and of the ways in which they were perceived
by these supervisory authorities.

-11-

Use of Effectiveness Measures
For each of the major agencies included in the 1978 Mayor's Management Report,
the "Operating Statistics 11 portion of the report has been categorized for this.
study as to whether the reported measures do, in fact, provide meaningful indicators
of the service effectiveness of the agency. There can be no question that agencies
saw themselves as under a mandate to produce some type of data, but the variation
in data presented suggests considerable agency freedom in what types of infonnation
they decided to include.
Agencies are grouped together by the quality of the indicators they presented: 13 a
.

Agencies with good indicators of program effectiveness as of 1978
Department of Correction
Department of Environmental Protection
Department of Parks and Recreation
Agencies with fair indicators of program effectiveness as of 1978
Board of Higher Education
Department of Finance
Department of Health
Health and Hospitals Corporation
Department of Housing Preservation and Development 14
Housing Authority
Police Department
Department of Sani ta.ti on
Department of Transportation
Agencies with poor indicators of program effectiveness as of 1978
Board of Education
Fire Department
Department of General Services
Dept. of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Alcoholism Services
Department of Social Services
Examples of good effectiveness indicators
Department of Correction
Number of escapes
Number of ''unusual occurrences involving gross violations of institutional order"
Number of inmates taking and passing high school equivalency diploma exam
Percentage of 11 priority cases 11 delivered to State Supreme Court by 9 a.m.

-12Department of Environmental Protection
Average time .to repair water main breaks
Backlog of broken hydrants
·
Percentage of effluent complying with federal standards
Average catch basin complain response time
Percentage of days with air quality rated "healthy"
Department of Parks and Recreation
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage

of play equipment useable
of playground benches useab4e
of tennis courts useable
of-confort stations useable
of drinking fountains useable

It should be recognized that the use of these indicators could not be explained
.

.

simply by an agency desire to present favorable statistics to the general public,
since the data presented under these headings do not necessarily show the agencies
involv~d to have especially effective programs.
For the Department of Correction, twenty-two escapes were reported (compared
to a 11 plan 11 of only eight), and less than half of those inmates taking the equivalency
diploma test passed.

(The Department did report that the number of "unusual- occurrences 11

had declined from 684 the year before to 521, and.that 100% of 11 prioritycases 11 were
delivered to court by 9 a.m.)
The Department of Environmental Protection report showed either declining or
stable indicators of service effectiveness. The percentage of effluent complying
with federal standards declined from 90.4% to 85.7% (and.compared unfavorably to a
11

plan 11 for 90.5% compliance.) Average catch basin complaint time to completion

of repairs increased from 18.2 days to 19.9 despite a "planned" reduction to 14.0.
(Data for the other three statistics reported above all remained at relatively
constant levels of effectiveness from the year before.)
In the Department of Parks and Recreation, in all cases but one where the
department made a comparison with either past perfonnance or "plans," its
indicators showed declining performance or failure to meet the agency plan.

(The

one exception was percentage of comfort stations useable, which improved from 53%
to 65%).

-13Since it is clear that these data do not show particularly_high program
effectiveness, it is obviously not the case that the agencies using these types
of indicators were a self-selected group of successfuP departments.

Rather,'

11

it is the argument of this paper, that such reporting is of utility to agencies
which wish to 11 look good, 11 not to a general public concerned with public services,
but to a specialized group of elite observers. interested in agency management
techniques.
Not all agencies responded in this fashion, of course.

But what distinguished

the agencies which I have classified as having either 11 fair 11 or 11 poor11 indicators
was not the level of perfonnance shown, but the relative absence of measures of
program effectiveness. Agencies were classified as 11 fair 11 if they presented data
which indicated something about their costs or scope of services, but did not
extend these measures do indicate program impact.
Thus, within the 11 fair 11 category are agencies such as the Board of Higher
Education (City University), which reported the cost of education per full-timeequivalent student, but no indicators of the educational perfonnance of these
students. The Department of Finance produced dollar figures on arrearages, but
not on arrearages collected. The Department of Health showed figures for 11 average
time to inspect 1 immediate 1 complaints," defined as complaints which pose an
imminent danger to public health (and showed that the average response time was
3.3 days), but produced no figures on_the impact of its services on the public
health of the population.
Agencies classified as 11 poor 11 produced few if any indicators which were
service-related. The Board of Education
did reproduce New York State figures on
I
percentage of students reading at or above grade level in the third andsixth
grade, but produced no data of its own on educational performance, and little in
the way of infonnation which might relate costs and services. Thus; cost per
11

pupi1 was calculated, but not tied to any measure of output.
11

-14In a 11 harder 11 service, the Fire Department reported-on fire alarm responses,
but presented no information on either costs or on effectiveness in extinguishing
fires or in fire prevention. The Department of General Services reported on
expenses in building cleaning, but not on building cleanliness, and its indicatcrs
of supply acquisitions were numbers of purchase orders issued and costs of goods
purchased-, without any suggestion as to how such numbers might be interpreted to
indicate efficiency in supply acquisition. And the Department of Social Services
reported on numbers of cases receiving public assistance in its various aid
categories, but little else.
As thes.e summaries Of agency reported operattng statistics show , wide
variation was found in types of reports submitted, and these do not appear to vary
by agency type.
11

11

Harder 11 services were not found to have any advantage over

softer 11 services in producing good measures.
Cost Reduction Memoranda
The judgements reported on in the previous section of this paper were drawn

from the reports submitted by city agencies to externa 1 monitors, but were not the·
direct judgements of the external monitors themselves.

In this section I am

reporting on a set of indicators which do show the direct judgements of outside
supervisory bodies which came into being in New York in the aftermath of the fiscal
crisis.
I argued above that one of the consequences of the fiscal crisis was to put
agencies under less pressure to provide 11 effective 11 services.

Both the interview

data and the Management Report data presented here indicate an agency perception
that it is not essential in the post-crisis period to show service effectiveness
improvement.

Cost control is, of course, a quite different matter. We should

expect, therefore,. that direct suggesti ans to city agencies from the Emergency
Financial Control Board would be perceived by the agencies involved as significant
prods to action.

-15Examination of Cost Reduction Memoranda issued by the Emergency Financial
Control Board in the years 1975-1978 shows that few, if any, municipal agencies
received no CRM's.

But the distribution of these memoranda by agency was decidedly

uneven, and shows heavy concentration on certain agencies.
Number of Cost Reduction Memoranda per Department
-, 1
Health and Hospitals Corporation
Police Department 15
9
Housing Oepartm ~ts
8
Socia 1 Services 1
7
Finance Department
4
General Services; Transportation
2 each
Correction; Health; Mental Health; Traffic;
Fire; Higher Education; Housing Authority;
Sanitation; Parks; Transit Authority
1 each

This concentration of attention on certain specific departments conforms well
to. both public and elite perceptions of' the major cost control controversies in
post-crisis New York City.

One fonner head of an external control agency described

the continuing controversies over the Health and Hospitals Corporation as a
challenge perceived by minority groups as a "direct taking away of a service they
used, as discrimination, 11 and felt sure_that the protest engendered by threats
of hospital closings was widely felt in poor communities and was not just a reaction
by threatened employees. Another described management problems within the housing
departments as an example of an area which needed to make considerable improvements, but
had not been able to use the fiscal crisis as a lever to do so.
It will be noted that there is considerable overlap, but by no means identity,
between the lists of agencies with fair or poor effectiveness indicators and the
list of agencies with substantial numbers of Cost Reduction Memoranda. Two of the
three agencies with the best effectiveness indicators received only one memo each,
and the third received no memos at all.
Since the fundamental goal of the Emergency Financial Control Board was to

-16keep New York City government spending totals in check, it might be thought that
Cost Reduction Memoranda would be targeted toward those agencies which had grown
disproportionately in the period preceding the fiscal crisis. Alternatively, it
might be argued that Cost Reduction Memoranda were particularly aimed toward those
agencies where decisions had already been taken to retrench disproportionately, as
a specific prod to comply with a prior, more general, cost reduction mandate.
These two distinctive, but not incompatible, perspectives can be. examined by
comparing the agencies high on the Cost Reduction Memoranda list with those agencies
high in pre-crisis growth pr post-crisis cutbacks. James Hartman has provided such
a catalogue of New York C_ity agencies and his typology is reproduced below: 17
New York City Expenditure Functions Classified
By 1970-1975 Rates of Growth and 1975-1978
Levels of Retrenchment
High growth, high retrenchment
Higher education
Courts
Health
Housing Authority
High growth, low retrenchment
Correction
Transportation
Transit Authority
Housing development
Human Resources Program .
Charitable institutions - hospitals
Health and Hospitals Corporation
Medical assistance payments
Low growth, high retrenchment
Police
Fire
Low growth, low retrenchment
Education
Parks
Environmental protection
Social services
Charitable institutions - foster care
General government

-17When we compare Hartman's categorizations with those presented earlier for
Cost Reduction Memoranda, it becomes clear that these CRM's were not just targeted
on agencies with disproportionate past growth or on agencies 11 targeted 11 for high
retrenchment.
11

While the high-CRM agencies might indeed have been those with

poor 11 reputations among external mo•nitors, they are not necessarily the agencies

which actually bore the brunt of post-crisis cutbacks.
When we compare these categorizations with the service effectiveness data
presented earlier, we see some relationship.

All three of the agencies with the

best effectiveness data are agencies with low rates of retrenchment. While many
low retrenchment agencies presented poor effectiveness data, it may be that the
strains associated with the highest rates of post-crisis retrenchment preclude
the effort required to develop good. data, while low retrenchment may be a necessary
but not sufficient condition for the development of good effectiveness indicators.
(It should be remembered, in this context, that even these low retrenchment
agencies produced service indicators which showed declining rates of effective
performance in the post-crisis period.)
But there is no reason to think that low retrenchment was a "reward" for
good effectiveness measures.

Indeed, the indicators of effectiveness presented

. here foll ow rather than precede the retrenchment measures. What is perhaps more
intriguing is the absence of much relationship between a reputation for ineffectiveness and high levels of retrenchment. The question for municipal managers during
periods of fiscal stringency, therefore, is whether there are indeed incentives
for 11 good behavior?"
The criticism process doesn 1 t guarantee retrenchment, because retrenchment
is more a function of the political calculus and funding sources. An agency
which confonns. to 11 businesslike 11 standards may receive less criticism, but not
necessarily less cutting. While external monitors may disapprove of this situation
in principle, they accept it in practice because their primary goal, that of
control of the total budget size, is not jeopardized by this pattern.

-18External monitoring may have produced a partial incentive for the development
of more 11 businesslike 11 municipal agency practices, but the incentives provided for
compliance were very weak.
I suggested three hypotheses at the outset about the circumstances under
which New York City agencies would be likely to develop good 11 effectiveness 11
measures. These were the 11 sectoral , 11 the 11.budgetary change, 11 and the "leadership"
hypotheses. As has been seen, the sectoral hypothesis does not appear to be
valid, at least in the context of this study. Neither 11 hard 11 nor 11 soft 11 agencies
were concentrated at the 11 good 11 or "poor" levels of effectiveness indicators.
The "budgetary change" hypothesis receives some confinnation, albeit partial
in nature.

Good effectiveness indicators are found among those agencies with low

retrenchment, but there is little reason to think that it was the. 11 businesslike"
approach of these agencies which provided them with protection from higher rates
of retrenchment.
The tables-presented do not permit a direct test of the 11 leadership 11 hypothesis,.
but the interview data presented suggest that at least those with administrative
responsibility in New York City at both the central and line levels believed this
to be the crucial factor.

Agency heads were shown to have varied widely in their

perception of the utility of such procedures, and have noticed such variations
among their colleagues as well.

Individuals who held leadership positions in

external monitoring agencies during the period under study made similar judgements
as well.

11

Leadership, 11 in this context, is the personal commitment of the agency

commissioner and his chosen subordinates to an emphasis on the types of agency
practices admired by outside observers.

But given the short-term nature of

administrative office in New York City, particularly for those who "look good 11 to
these outside observers, this role for leadership is an insufficient mechanism
for long-tenn service improvement.

As the llcrisis 11 routinizes, the routines of

public management, which do not emphasize measures of service effectiveness,
return to the fore.

It is for this reason that those interviewees with external

monitoring experience felt that the opportunity for such agencies to be effective
instruments of management change had passed • .If they were to play a significant
role, it would have had to have been in the years immediately after the crisis
began, and would have required that external monitors' judgements about agency
effectiveness have been systematically translated into retrenchment priorities.
This clearly did not happen in the New York City case.
But this ought to have. been expected.

I have argued elsewhere that in the

immediate aftermath of a fiscal crisis, priority-setting is unlikely because of
the shock of, the situation and a preoccupation with the crisis' day-to-day
details. 19 This is consistent with respondents' reports about the actions of the
New York City Financial Control Board.
It is ironic,- therefore ,to note that in the several years that follow, as
the crisis be.comes routine, that mechanisms for priority-setting do begin to
emerge, that it is poss.ible to identify agencies which appear more "businesslike,"
and that this variation is visible to external monitors.

By the time these procedures

develop, however, the opportunity of these monitors to use the crisis as a lever for
change has passed by.
The continued needs for fiscal austerity in the aggregate, which still
dominate the. concerns of the external monitors, combine with the. political needs of
elected officials to produce a budgetary policy in which information about program
effectiveness plays a secondary role. The differential funding sources for
different types of programs· (and the consequent differential savings achievable
by different types of cuts) remain the most central concern of budget officials, while
the differential political effects of different types of cuts remain the central
concern of elected officials.
The development of "businesslike effectiveness" within agencies, while
enhanced in some senses by fiscal crisis, remains largely a matter of the values
and skills of the line agency administrator, and not a structured part of a larger
'
municipal
incentive system.

-20Footnotes
1., What is central to this work, therefore, is not the validity of the reports
provided, but whether agencies take the risk involved in developing and
µ·resenting measures of their performance which are in fact related to
agency mission.
·
2.

For examples of this argument see:
Raymond Horton, "Sayre and Kaufman Revisited: New York City
Government in the Post-1965 Period," 1977· American Political Science
Association convention paper
Ken Auletta, The Streets Were Paved With Gold (New York: Random House, 1979)
Stephen David and Paul Kantor, 11 Policy Theory, Political Change, and the
City Budgetary Process: The Case of New York City," 1978 American Political
Science Association convention paper

3. Andrew Glassberg, 11 0rganizational Responses to Municipal Budget Decreases, 11
Public Administration Review, July/August, 1978, pp. 325-32
4.

For an example of this, see:_·
Harry Hatry and Donald Fisk, "Local Government Productivity Improvement
Possibilities, 11 in Marc Holzer (ed.) Productivity in Public Organizations
(Port Washington: Kennikat, 1976) pp. 295-308, which emphasizes the 11 harder 11
services in its catalogue of areas for productivity improvement.

5.

Charles Levine, "More on Cutback Management: Hard Questions for Hard Times,"
Public Administration Review March/April, 1978, pp. 179-183, argues that
it is difficult to get local governments to invest in productivity during
austerity. More directly within the New York City governmental structure,
the Office of Operations (the management arm of the Mayor 1 s office) argued
that productivity gains could not be maintained in an environment of
continuing budget cuts. New York Times, Jan. 17, 1980, B4

6.

For an example of these earlier efforts, see:
Herbert Haber, 11 The New York City Approach to Improving Productivity in
the Public Sector," in Marc Holzer (ed.) op. cit. pp. 159-172. The more
recent period in New York City is described in, Mary McCormick, "Productivity
Programs and Issues," in Raymond Horton and Charles Brecher (eds.) Setting
Municipal Priorities, 1980 (Montclair: Allenheld and Osmun, 1979) pp. 171-194

7.

For a review of many of these earlier efforts, see:
David Rogers, Can Business Management Save the Cities:· The Case of New York
. (New York: Free Press, 1978). Rogers argues that the complexities of New
York made a systematically effective role for private sector consultants
very difficult, although he continued to think that they might be more
effective in smaller municipalities.

8. This is the view of the important outside observer body, the .Citizens Budget
Commission. See: 11 A Review of New York City's Management Program, 11
Citizens Budget Commission, Vol. 45, no. 2 (July, 1978) p. ii

-219. The interview excerpts presented here are drawn from tape-recorded interviews
conducted in December, 1979, with a group of current New York City agency
commissioners and other individuals who had occupied significant leadership
positions in external monitoring agencies such as the Emergency Financial ·
Control Board and the New York City Office of Management and Budget. All
were promised anonymity and the text, therefore, does not identify the
agencies with which they serve(d).
10. Anthony Downs.

Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967)

11. Citizens Budget Commission, op. cit., p. iii
12. The source
for the data used here is a recodification of material from the
Mayor 1 s Management Report presented in:
Office of the State Comptroller, Office of the Special Deputy Comptroller
for New York City, "Fact _Sheets for Major Agencies in New York City, Showing
Data as of June, 197811 FCB-1-80, June 11, 1979. The data were drawn from
an updated version of the 1978 Mayor 1 s Management Report issued on August
18, 1978. Data reported for 1978 was unaudited, and therefore reflects the
agency I s choice on how to present i tse 1f. ·
13. Office of the State Comptroller, Office of the Special Deputy Comptroller for
New York City, "Summary of Cost Reduction Memoranda Submitted to the City ·
as of December 31 , 1978" FCB-21-80, June 11, 1979, p. i.
·
13a. Thesa categorizations are mine, not the EFCB's.
14.

HPO and HA data were not included in EFCB recodifications of the 1978 Mayor's
Management Report. Indicators for these agencies were examined by using
retrospective information in the 1979 Mayor 1 s Management Report, City of
New York, Mayor 1 s Management Report, April 26, 1979

15. The figure for 11 housing departments" is a combination of memos issued to the
Housing and Development Administration, and the separate departments into
which it was subsequently separated.
16.

11

Social services" memo totals include memos issued to the Department of Social
Services and is predecessor, the Human Resources Administration (which included
other functions as well.)
·

17. This table is drawn from James Hartman, 11 Expenditures and Services, 11 in Horton
and Brecher (eds.) op. cit. p. 58. Since,Hartman presents his data by
"expenditure functionll rather than by city agencies, the categories he uses
are not identical to those used in earlier tables.
18. This is consistent with Hartman's explanation of the dynamics of high growth
and high retrenchment. In his interpretation, high growth in the pre-crisis
period was concentrated in those agencies where new federal matching funds
could be attracted. High retrenchment was concentrated in those agencies
where functions could be moved out of the city's jurisdiction (usually to
the state) and in those agencies where there were few matching funds and
high municipal discretion about service levels.· Some agencies are low in
retrenchment because of externally mandated spending levels. Hartman, op. cit.
These criteria stand independent of the ty~es of management effectiveness (and
perceptions of management effectiveness) measures this study has primarily
been concerned with.

-2219. Andrew Glassberg, "Response to Budgetary Stringency: New York and London, 11
1978 World Congress of Sociology convention paper.

